Book Review. Rodell, F., Woe Unto You, Lawyers! by Hall, Jerome
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1941
Book Review. Rodell, F., Woe Unto You, Lawyers!
Jerome Hall
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Legal Profession Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hall, Jerome, "Book Review. Rodell, F., Woe Unto You, Lawyers!" (1941). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 1385.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1385
BOOK REVIEWS 359 
struggle among agnostics, materialists, and idealists, with "each major 
type of philosophy" being regarded as "a partial revelation of reality." 
The concluding brief chapter on "Scholar and Poet" hardly clarifies mat- 
ters by such statements as: "A finding of science and a work of art are 
alike in origin. They are alike in the test of their truth and worth ..... The 
supreme test for what each man reports is the judgment of those who 
come nearest to sharing his judgment" (pp. I29-30). President Bryan 
ends his lectures with an autobiographical note in the form of a summing- 
up of "the chief of what I have seen. I have had sight of chaos and hell, 
but also, on every side, I have seen the irrepressible emergence of order, 
reason, beauty, love." It may well be that others will develop further, 
and more systematically, his notion of human temperaments and their 
demands as forming something like "families of minds." 
HAROLD A. LARRABEE 
Union College 
WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYERS ! By Fred Rodell. New York: Reynal & Hitch- 
cock, I939. Pp. Xi+274. 
The following excerpts from the above book indicate the general tenor 
of the author's thesis: 
Of course any lawyer will bristle, or snort with derision, at the idea that what 
he deals in is words. He deals, he will tell you, in propositions, concepts, funda- 
mental principles-in short, in ideas (p. 9). Once brought down to earth, once 
applied to physical facts, the abstractions become nothing but words-words 
by which lawyers describe, and justify, the things that lawyers do (p. io). The 
legal trade, in short, is nothing but a high-class racket (p. Is). Consideration- 
and every other so-called concept or principle of The Law-amounts to a vague 
legal way of stating a result, applied to the result after the result is reached, 
instead of being, as the lawyers and judges stoutly pretend, a reason for reaching 
the result in the first place (p. 55-56). But even when the nine master jugglers 
[United States Supreme Court] are working at their smoothest, it requires only 
a trained eye to see that those weighty thoughts they seem to be tossing around 
are in reality no more than balloons, full of hot air and easily punctured (p. I3 I) . 
They balance-don't laugh-one set of abstract principles against another and, 
through some sort of trance-like transference, come out with a specific decision. 
They take the long words and sonorous phrases of The Law, no matter how 
ambiguous or empty of meaning, no matter how contradictory of each other; 
they weigh these words and phrases in a vacuum-which is the only way they 
could be weighed; and then they "apply" the weightier to the dispute in ques- 
tion with all the finality that might be accorded a straight wire from God (p. 
I52-53). The sober truth is that the myriad principles of which The Law is 
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fashioned resemble nothing so much as old saws, dressed up in legal language 
and paraded as gospel. When Justice Marshall intoned "The power to tax 
involves the power to destroy," and on the basis of that principle declared that 
a certain state tax was illegal, he might just as well have said "Great oaks from 
little acorns grow" and founded his decision on that-except that he would not 
have sounded quite so impressive (p. i65). The joker in the theory is the as- 
sumption that any two, much less twenty, fact situations or legal problems can 
ever be sufficiently alike to fall naturally-that is, without being pushed- 
into the same category (p. i69). For if The Law were really the exact and im- 
partial science it purports to be, instead of being an uncertain and imprecise 
abracadabra devoted to the solemn manipulation of a lot of silly abstractions, 
none of these bases of inequality and injustice would, or could, exist (p. 245). 
Since certainty and consistency are impossible of attainment in orderly control 
of men's affairs, the sensible thing to do would seem to be to go straight after 
justice in the settlement of any specific question that comes up for solution. 
Now justice itself is concededly an amorphous and uncertain ideal. One man's 
justice is another man's poison (pp. 25I-52). Every written law-written, you 
remember, in comprehensible language-might be entrusted to a body of tech- 
nical experts, to administer and apply it and make specific decisions under it. 
As the Interstate Commerce Commission applies the Interstate Commerce Act, 
as the Federal Trade Commission applies the Clayton Act, so each state would 
have, say, a Killing Commission to apply its laws about what are now called 
murder and manslaughter (pp. 263-64). 
The author has much talent and a facile style. His book has been 
criticized so adversely that there is little point in adding to this consensus. 
If his central argument is admitted, one must conclude that any rational 
adjudication of disputes is impossible. For his espousal of arbitration and 
decision by experts simply begs the entire question of the bases for such 
"sound" solution. The book would have aroused little comment had it 
been written by a journalist; the author is a professor of law, and one is 
accordingly led to ask whether it is sensible to speak of "obligation" or 
"responsibility" on the part of legal scholars and, indeed, of educated 
persons generally. The reviewer answers this question emphatically in the 
affirmative-if ever there was a time when sound jurisprudence was vital 
to the preservation of civilization, however understood, the present is 
assuredly that time. But such terms as "obligation," "scholar's respon- 
sibility" cannot be meaningful to the nominalistic, logical-positivistic 
mentality of the author of this book. It is to be hoped that he will culti- 
vate what common sense he has. 
JEROME HALL 
Indiana University Law School 
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